Force Design for Persistent Competition: Structuring the Joint Force for Irregular Warfare Dominance

The U.S. understands irregular warfare conceptually, but has yet to turn that understanding into a deliberately designed and adequately resourced force. Despite national strategies that prioritize persistent competition below armed conflict, the Joint Force still relies on rotational, episodic models built for a different era. This paper argues that the core problem isn’t conceptual, but structural. While today’s dispersed capabilities deliver impressive tactical results, they lack the continuity, integration, and long-term campaigning needed to counter adversaries who operate persistently and across domains.

Applying the Department of War’s own force‑design and requirements frameworks, the paper identifies where current structures fall short and outlines what an effective irregular warfare force must deliver: persistence, interagency integration, organic influence capability, legal agility, and continuous assessment. It then evaluates three paths forward, from adapting existing formations to creating a purpose‑built IW campaign regiment, and makes the case for a realistic, strategically aligned solution achievable within five to seven years.

If the U.S. intends to compete and win in the gray zone, it must build a force specifically designed for that fight.

Read the full paper to explore the design logic, organizational options, and the force‑development path forward.