CACI Headquarters - Arlington, VA
The examples below show some of the most common and egregious media or pundit errors made about CACI, followed by the truth about CACI's work and conduct throughout the investigations about Abu Ghraib.
|Error||Private government contracting is a recent phenomenon of the war on terrorism that is costly to taxpayers. FALSE|
|Truth||The recent private government contracting sector positions grew out of the military downsizing in the early 1990s
aimed at reducing military personnel levels. The system of private contracting was set up to save taxpayer money by using contractors on
an "as needed" basis rather than maintaining military salaries and benefits year round, year after year, on through retirement (and
costs) for non-military kinds of work. When contractor services are no longer required they can be cut back quickly.
High technology has also driven the shift toward contractors who possess professional computer and technical skills that are not readily available in an all-volunteer force in the numbers and skill categories required. Contractor support remains readily available for years at a time without training reinvestment by the government.
Furthermore, there was a very substantial increase in 2003 in civilian contractors supporting forces on the battlefield in Iraq versus the 1991 Gulf War. Of course, the magnitude and duration of the 2003 Iraq War has been substantially greater than the 1991 Gulf War.
|Error||The use of government contractors for military support in a war zone was first introduced with the Iraq war. FALSE|
|Truth||Contractors have been used throughout American history to support the military going back to the Revolutionary War (1775-1783). The Pinkerton detective agency was a primary source of intelligence during the Civil War. Since the Gulf War of 1991 contractors have played a vital role in every major U.S. military engagement. The Clinton administration turned to private firms to provide a variety of field services in the Balkan conflict rather than call up military reserve units.|
|Error||Abu Ghraib was the first time and place that the U.S. government used civilian contractors for interrogation of detainees. FALSE|
|Truth||Civilian contractors were already being used for interrogation in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, and in Afghanistan when the government contracted with CACI to provide interrogators in Iraq.|
|Error||There was no investigation into the abuses at Abu Ghraib before Taguba's report. FALSE|
|Truth||According to Gen. Richard B. Myers, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, "...the commander of the CJTF-7, General Sanchez back in August said 'I want to look at our detention operations and our interrogation operations.' And he had the provost marshal of the Army, Major General Ryder, appointed to do that investigation."|
|Error||The Taguba report was released to the public by the Army in April 2004. FALSE|
|Truth||The Taguba report was a classified document (SECRET/NO FOREIGN) that was illegally leaked to the press before
the Army and DoD had had a full opportunity to review and act on the report.
As stated by Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld in his testimony to the Senate Armed Services Committee, "We did not release the Taguba report to the press. That was done by someone to release against the law a secret document… All I know is when it was made public, when somebody took a secret document out of prosecutorial channels and released it to the press, I do not believe it was yet anywhere in the Pentagon. Certainly, I had not been given it or seen it."
|Error||The source that broke the law and illegally leaked the classified military document written by Maj. Gen. Antonio Taguba (known as the Taguba report) to the press in the middle of an ongoing military investigation and legal proceedings has been prosecuted. FALSE|
|Truth||The person who broke the law and illegally leaked the classified Taguba report to the press alleging abuse by members of the military who were entitled to due process (without influence) and CACI and its employee (before all evidence was gathered and investigations concluded) and exposing U.S. military and U.S. citizens to increased danger and violence, has never been identified or brought to justice.|
|Error||The Taguba report is based on an in-depth and detailed investigation into the intelligence gathering and interrogation practices at Abu Ghraib. FALSE|
|Truth||The Taguba report was not based on an investigation of interrogators, interrogation practices, or intelligence gathering at Abu Ghraib. The Taguba report was based on an investigation of Military Police (MP) activity at Abu Ghraib.|
|Error||The Taguba report was the final investigative report on abuse allegations at Abu Ghraib in 2003 and early 2004. FALSE|
|Truth||The Taguba report was one of several investigations into abuse allegations at Abu Ghraib and it was directed
specifically at investigating Military Police (MPs). Other investigations followed that specifically examined other aspects of the
prison, including intelligence gathering, interrogations, and interrogators.
In several cases these later reports came to different conclusions than Maj. Gen. Taguba, including his conclusions about interrogators. At the time the Taguba report was illegally leaked to the press and being quoted widely, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld stated in his testimony to the Senate Armed Services Committee (June 7, 2004): "In addition to the Taguba report, there are other investigations under way… And because all the facts are not in hand, there will be corrections and clarifications to the record as more information is learned."
|Error||All of Maj. Gen. Taguba's recommendations were implemented by the military and the government at the conclusion of his report. FALSE|
|Truth||According to Lt. Gen. Lance L. Smith, in his testimony to the House Armed Services Committee on May 7, 2004, "I would say 75% of the recommendations have already been implemented. And the ones that have not are either in the process of being implemented or being evaluated as to whether that's the best course or another course might be better."|
|Error||CACI and its employees were "involved in," "participated in," or have been "charged" with abusing detainees or "directing the abuse" of detainees at Abu Ghraib. FALSE|
|Truth||Neither CACI nor any of its employees have been found or proven to be "involved in" or "participated in" or
"charged" with abuse, nor have they been indicted for "directing abuse." Several investigations resulted from the abuse allegations at Abu Ghraib.
The first, the Ryder report, made no mention of CACI.
The second, the Taguba report, which was based on an investigation of Military Police (not military intelligence, including interrogators) stated a suspicion about one CACI employee (and misidentified another suspected individual as a CACI employee). Several other official investigations followed (including specific investigations of interrogators and intelligence gathering at Abu Ghraib) which did not result in anyone from CACI being indicted or charged with any abuses at Abu Ghraib.
In his report, Maj. Gen. Taguba urged that CACI employee Steven Stefanowicz be removed from his job, reprimanded, and denied his security clearance for allegedly lying to the investigating team and allegedly allowing or ordering MPs, who were not trained in interrogation techniques, to facilitate interrogations by setting conditions that Maj. Gen. Taguba said were neither authorized nor in accordance with Army regulations. All of Maj. Gen. Taguba's allegations regarding this employee remain unsupported based on all of the evidence made available to date.
|Error||The Taguba report provided "evidence" that two CACI employees were "either indirectly or directly" responsible for the abuses at Abu Ghraib prison. FALSE|
|Truth||Only one of the two people listed in the Taguba report as being employed by CACI was a CACI
employee. John Israel was never employed by CACI. The Taguba report was also not an investigation of CACI employees or of
interrogators at Abu Ghraib. The generalized conclusion of the Taguba report (based on an investigation of Military Police) as it
related to the one employee of CACI (Steven Stefanowicz) remains completely unsupported by any of the documents and evidence made
available to date.
The Taguba report is also contradicted in important respects by the Army's subsequent Kern/Jones/Fay report that investigated military intelligence and interrogators.
|Error||John Israel worked for CACI as a "secret agent." FALSE|
|Truth||John Israel was incorrectly identified as a CACI employee in the Taguba report. Israel was employed by a Titan (Corp.) subcontractor as a translator and never worked for CACI. CACI has no knowledge of the circumstances of John Israel's employment.|
|Error||Taguba "found" that Steven Stefanowicz engaged in or directed abuse of detainees at Abu Ghraib. FALSE|
|Truth||Taguba did not "find" Stefanowicz to have engaged in abuse but stated his "suspicion" that Stefanowicz, along with three other individuals (two U.S. Army officers and one civilian contractor), was either "directly or indirectly" responsible, and this allegation was not specifically defined, verified, or elaborated upon with regard to Stefanowicz.|
|Error||Taguba provided "back-up support and evidence" for his statement that CACI interrogator Steven Stefanowicz was either "directly or indirectly" responsible for the abuses at Abu Ghraib (along with three other individuals, one of whom Taguba also listed as a CACI employee). FALSE|
|Truth||Neither the Taguba report itself, nor any of the annexes of the report (released to date) provided any evidence to
support the "suspicion" that Steve Stefanowicz, a CACI employee, was "directly or indirectly" responsible for abuses at
Abu Ghraib. In an interview in 2005, Maj. Gen. Taguba himself stated that he had not given much thought to what he meant by "direct" or
Later investigations and reports did not validate Taguba's statement in this regard and one of the other three individuals named, another civilian, John Israel, was later fully exonerated.
|Error||CACI provided mercenaries or armed private security personnel or physical security services. FALSE|
|Truth||CACI does not and never has provided "mercenary" warfighter combatant forces or services. CACI has never provided combat soldiers (mercenaries) to the U.S. Army or any other army. CACI has never been contracted to provide "mercenaries," armed private security personnel, paramilitary, or any physical security services; nor has CACI ever engaged in any such business activity requiring or involving employees' occupational use of arms/weapons.|
|Error||CACI engaged in spy activities. FALSE|
|Truth||CACI has never performed any spy work or engaged in any similar espionage activities.|
|Error||CACI knew of assassinations. FALSE|
|Truth||CACI has never had any knowledge of assassinations, murders, or any other similar unlawful activities.|
|Error||CACI provided translation and/or interpreter services. CACI employees could not speak or read English. FALSE|
|Truth||CACI has never provided translator or interpreter services in Iraq, Afghanistan, or in any theater of war. All of CACI's interrogators in Iraq were U.S. citizens who held appropriate current U.S. government security clearances.|
|Error||Interrogation services were a significant part of CACI's revenue. FALSE|
|Truth||CACI's interrogation support and analysis work for the U.S. Army in Iraq was less than 1% of the company's total worldwide business.|
|Error||CACI provided interrogators at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, and Afghanistan. FALSE|
|Truth||CACI never had interrogators at Guantanamo Bay or Afghanistan. CACI interrogation services were provided only in Iraq. Civilian interrogators at Guantanamo Bay and Afghanistan were provided by other government contractors.|
|Error||CACI contract interrogators made up the majority of interrogators at Abu Ghraib. FALSE|
|Truth||CACI did not have more than 10 interrogators assigned and working at Abu Ghraib prison at any one time. During that same period, CACI employed approximately 140 other people for a wide range of intelligence, technical, logistics, and project support work throughout Iraq.|
|Error||CACI was under pressure to fill interrogator slots quickly and faced financial penalties for not filling quotas on time, which would look bad on the company's record. FALSE|
|Truth||CACI's contract, as is standard, contained manning requirements specifying the type and number of positions. The Army was critically short-handed and the company held weekly updates with the customer to advise on the arrival of personnel. Staff at the prison was desperately needed; however, CACI could only send employees who fully met the standards established by the contract.|
|Error||CACI employees were not U.S. citizens, nor did they have the required security clearances. FALSE|
|Truth||All CACI employees in Iraq were U.S. citizens and held appropriate and current U.S. government security clearances.|
|Error||CACI shortcut its hiring process by not fully interviewing and qualifying applicants. In its haste to fill interrogator positions CACI hired "cooks and truck drivers." CACI employed individuals who did not meet the hiring criteria and were not qualified to do interrogations. FALSE|
|Truth||CACI was rigorous and selective in its hiring process, carefully screening and qualifying all potential interrogators
presented to the U.S. Army for the Army's review or acceptance. Out of approximately 1600 job applications, only 3% met the
statement of work requirements and qualifications and were interviewed. CACI streamlined its interview process for applicants who were
clearly qualified based on background and experience, but did not shortcut its hiring process.
All CACI interrogators met the qualifications set forth in the government's statement of work for the contract. Hiring selections were made by staff with expertise in the contract and job requirements. Fewer than 2% of applicants were employed as CACI interrogators in Iraq. All interrogators were U.S. citizens. All interrogators had appropriate U.S. government security clearances, which require government background checks. All interrogators hired for work in Iraq were approved or accepted by the Army.
The statement of work further specified that the Army would provide CACI employees with readiness training and briefings on rules of engagement and general orders applicable to U.S. Armed Forces, DoD civilians, and U.S. contractors.
The Army Inspector General concluded that every one of CACI's interrogators satisfied the qualification criteria established by the government and set forth in the contract. Furthermore, the Church report stated, "On average, contractors were more experienced than military interrogators and this advantage enhanced their credibility with detainees and promoted successful interrogations. There is no link between approved interrogation techniques and detainee abuse." The Schlesinger report stated, "Some of the older contractors had backgrounds as former military interrogators and were generally considered more effective than some of the junior enlisted personnel."
|Error||CACI interrogators reported to the CIA. FALSE|
|Truth||CACI interrogators never reported to the CIA; CACI employees only reported to U.S. military and CACI chains of command. At all times, CACI employees were subject to the supervision, direction, and control of the military in performing their duties. The CACI chain of command was for administrative and personnel management requirements and not for control or management of the interrogator support project's activities.|
|Error||CACI interrogators lacked military training. FALSE|
|Truth||Two thirds of CACI interrogators had previous military interrogator specialist training, and the rest had equivalent
experience from work in, or employment by, other agencies, for example the FBI, CIA, DEA or major police departments. Military training,
per se, was not a requirement in the Army's statement of work for interrogators, inasmuch as the appropriate equivalent
experiences may be obtained in other organizations as noted.
CACI interrogators met all the requirements for the job set out in the Army statement of work and were approved or agreed to for service by the Army. Three official military reports based on Abu Ghraib investigations indicated that military training, though desirable, had not been mandatory on CACI's contract and was not a defining factor in interrogator effectiveness or in the abuse charges.
|Error||CACI interrogators worked under little or no supervision. FALSE|
|Truth||The performance of CACI employees was monitored by both U.S. military and CACI chains of
command. CACI recruited individuals who possessed the maturity and experience needed for the job, since the positions, by their nature,
did not require continuous supervision.
When CACI interrogators arrived in Iraq, they reported to their military supervisor. This supervisor assigned the interrogators their tasks, determined where the interrogators were placed, and created their work schedules. All interrogators were under the control and supervision of the officer-in-charge of interrogation control.
|Error||CACI personnel supervised and/or directed the actions of military personnel. FALSE|
|Truth||CACI employees operated under the direct monitoring, supervision, and control of the U.S. military. At no time did
CACI employees have "chain of command" or supervisory authority over military personnel. At all times the U.S. government had oversight
of CACI's employees reporting to work, and this fact was supported in the Senate Armed Services hearings in May 2004. Secretary of
Defense Donald Rumsfeld stated in response to the question of what the roles of contractors were and who supervised them that the
contractors are "responsible to military intelligence who hire them and have the responsibility for supervising them."
Acting Secretary of Army Les Brownlee added, "In the theatre we have employed civilian contract interrogators and linguists, the central command has done this, and these people have no supervisory capabilities at all. They work under the supervision of officers-in-charge or noncommissioned officers-in-charge of whatever team or unit they are on. And they, most of them, are retired military and they are usually of the skill that they retired in and that is what they are employed for, and they assist in these processes. But they are not in a supervisory role."
Maj. Gen. Geoffrey Miller further stated that "no civilian contractors had a supervisory position. It's the military… who sets the priorities and ensures that we meet our standards."
|Error||CACI and the company's personnel were in charge of interrogations at Abu Ghraib. FALSE|
|Truth||Neither CACI nor any of its interrogators were ever in charge of interrogations or of U.S. military personnel, but
were, rather, reporting to the military chain of command. This is borne out in the testimony of key military leaders at the Senate Armed
Services Committee hearings on May 7, 2004:
Senator McCain: "I'd like to know who was in charge of the - what agencies or private contractors were in charge of interrogations? Did they have authority over the guards? … I'm asking who was in charge of the interrogations."
Lt. Gen. Smith: "They were not in charge. They were interrogators."
Senator McCain: "My question is: who was in charge of the interrogations?"
Lt. Gen. Smith: "The brigade commander for the military intelligence brigade."
Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld also stated: "The answer is that the civilian contractors… they're responsible to military intelligence who hire them, and have the responsibility over them."
|Error||CACI interrogators instructed the military police to "soften up" the prisoners for interrogation. FALSE|
|Truth||There is no credible evidence that has been made available at any time to support allegations that any CACI
interrogators directed any abuse of any detainee at any time, nor that they even had any authority whatsoever to have done so. The abuse
of detainees had nothing to do with interrogations, and this has been amply demonstrated by government investigations and reports as
well as in related testimony.
Interrogators did not direct the actions of military police and military police did not report to interrogators. According to Senator Roberts, during the Armed Services Committee hearings on May 7, 2004, "They (military intelligence and CIA representatives) indicated that at that particular time they did not know – had no evidence of any direction on the part of intelligence personnel at this prison suggesting that they commit these abuses at the behest of the military interrogators who asked the military police to, quote, 'soften up' the detainees to prepare them for the interrogation."
Joseph Darby, the soldier who submitted the Abu Ghraib pictures to his Army supervisors in January 2004, stated, "These guys [MPs] were doing nothing but occupying themselves in very sick ways. It was never about interrogations."
|Error||The CACI CEO's trip to Israel in January 2004 was made to investigate interrogation operations and torture methods. FALSE|
|Truth||The CEO's trip to Israel was part of a delegation to attend a conference entitled "Defense Aerospace Homeland
Security Mission of Peace." In addition to CACI's CEO, Dr. London, attendees included Dr. Rodney Leibowitz, Chairman of First Responder
Inc.; Dr. Sergio Magistri, President of Invision Technologies, Inc.; Robert Liscouski, Assistant Secretary for Information Analysis and
Infrastructure Protection for Homeland Security; Joe Reeder, former Undersecretary of the Army; Senator Evan Bayh (D-Indiana); Senator
Ben Nelson (D-Kansas); Congressman John Linder (D-Georgia); and Congressman John McHugh (R-New York).
CACI's CEO received the Albert Einstein Lifetime Achievement Award along with other attendees. The delegation included neither trips to prisons nor any research into interrogation. The delegation included numerous other government leaders and businessmen. Previous attendees to the conference have included Senator John Kerry (D-Massachusetts), former U.S. President Bill Clinton, former Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, and news people Barbra Walters and Tom Brokaw.
|Error||Abuse at Abu Ghraib occurred as a result of detainee interrogations by CACI. FALSE|
|Truth||Abuse at Abu Ghraib was not a function of interrogation practices. Nor did it result from CACI interrogation
activity. Furthermore, at all times CACI interrogator personnel were under the supervision of the U.S. military. As Joseph Darby, the
soldier who submitted the Abu Ghraib pictures to his army supervisors stated, "The soldiers involved at Abu Ghraib were not
interrogating inmates… These guys (MPs) were doing nothing but occupying themselves in very sick ways. It was never about
The Church report also stated: "There is no link between approved interrogation techniques and detainee abuse."
|Error||CACI was involved or responsible for torture and/or detainee abuse in Iraq and elsewhere in the world. FALSE|
|Truth||CACI has never engaged in any activities that fit or in any way whatsoever resemble torture, in Iraq or anywhere else in the world, at any time.|
|Error||CACI devised and condoned torture so as to increase profits and revenue. FALSE|
|Truth||CACI does not condone and has never engaged in any business activities that may be characterized in any way as "torture;" CACI has never done business that would condone, use, or promote any harm (intentional or otherwise) to anyone; CACI's revenue is derived solely from respectable, legitimate, and lawful business operations.|
|Error||CACI and Titan (Corp.) "teamed up" to conspire with members of the U.S. government or Army to increase demand for their services in order to increase revenues. FALSE|
|Truth||CACI and Titan had no partnership or appropriately qualified contractual arrangement in Iraq at any time. CACI's interrogation contract work represented less than 1% of its overall business. CACI did not engage in any activity that could be described in any way as an effort to increase interrogation demand. In fact, as a result of the company's rigorous hiring process aimed at providing qualified interrogators, some authorized positions were unfilled because of the difficulty of getting qualified applicants in service in Iraq under hostile war zone conditions.|
|Error||Images of CACI employees appear in the horrific detainee abuse photos taken at Abu Ghraib prison. FALSE|
|Truth||No CACI employee is depicted or seen in any of the notorious detainee abuse photos from Abu Ghraib prison.|
|Error||Iraq detainees have identified specific CACI employees as abusing them. FALSE|
|Truth||Some Iraq detainees who allege being abused at Abu Ghraib have reportedly stated that they were aware that contract employees were at the prison but no detainees have identified any specific CACI employee as abusing them. Nor has any verifiable evidence been provided substantiating or proving such allegations.|
|Error||Brigadier General Karpinski has stated that she saw CACI interrogators abuse detainees. FALSE|
|Truth||Brigadier General Karpinski has never claimed that she saw any CACI employee abuse any detainee. General Karpinski has stated that she was aware of CACI interrogators being present at the prison but has neither identified any specific CACI interrogators as engaging in any abuse nor provided verifiable evidence of any CACI interrogator being involved in detainee abuse.|
|Error||None of CACI's employees have been investigated for alleged involvement in abuse at Abu Ghraib. FALSE|
|Truth||The Department of the Army conducted multiple investigations regarding potential abuse by any civilian contract employee at Abu Ghraib, including those of CACI. Maj. Gen. Fay referred three CACI employees to the Department of Justice for further investigation but, to date, no one from CACI has been charged or indicted for any wrongdoing.|
|Error||CACI and the Army purposely hid the interrogator contract work under the Department of the Interior's Blanket Purchase Agreement (BPA) so as to conduct illegal activities. The CACI interrogation contract was issued through the Department of Interior in order to shelter its employees from potential prosecution within the military structure. FALSE|
|Truth||CACI has never hidden any contract or project work and has never engaged in any illegal activities. The goal in using
an existing BPA contract was speed, not to support any secret agenda, nor could it have been because the contract was at all times
completely open and public. CACI's project work in Iraq was always public information.
Blanket Purchase Agreements (BPAs) have been in use since 1998 and federal government procurement regulations provide for BPAs to enable the contracting agency (in this case located at Ft. Huachuca, AZ) to increase efficiency. Issued initially by the contracting office at Ft. Huachuca (then an Army contracting office), administration of the contract was transferred by the government to the Department of Interior (DOI). The existing DOI blanket purchase agreement which was already in place at Ft. Huachuca was used simply for expediency rather than going through the time consuming process of pursuing another contract vehicle to fulfill the Army's critical need for interrogators during an urgent and exigent wartime situation.
BPAs were important for the Army as it has worked to add resources in Iraq at a time of extreme need and urgency.
|Error||CACI used an existing information technology (IT) blanket purchase agreement (BPA) contract to get around the administrative details of a contract specific to interrogation work. CACI used an existing BPA to avoid a competitive bid of the interrogation contract. FALSE|
|Truth||Given the urgent and compelling circumstances of the war, the U.S. Army determined to have CACI provide intelligence
support services on a sole-source basis. An existing BPA for IT services was used for the purpose of expediency with the open agreement
of the Army and Department of Interior due to the Army's critical requirement during urgent wartime conditions in which interrogators were needed.
The interrogation work was seen as an extension of the work that CACI was conducting under the contract which called for tactical intelligence information collection, data analysis, and decision support. According to Frank Quimby, spokesman for the Interior Department, Interior approved the interrogation work under the IT blanket purchase agreement because it included "information technology aspects."
CACI acquired the General Services Administration (GSA) schedule contract as part of the assets it acquired when it bought out Premier Technology Group, Inc. (PTG) in May 2003. As background, the U.S. Army Directorate of Contracting, Ft. Huachuca, AZ had previously awarded a blanket purchase agreement to PTG against GSA Schedule Group 70 (Information Technology).
The same contract (BPA GSA IT Schedule 70) was also used initially by Lockheed Martin for interrogation services at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.
|Error||Using a contract with CACI for services to the Army, but which was administered by the Department of Interior, made it difficult and confusing to determine who was accountable for the contract. FALSE|
|Truth||According to Frank Quimby of the Interior Department, all three parties – contractor, Army, and Interior – have legal
responsibilities. "CACI's responsibility is to provide the services at a (negotiated) price… The Interior Department is responsible for
administering the contract, which includes issuing checks and contract forms… The Army is to provide the specifications, (determine the)
pay, and supervise the contract work and contract workers… They have the legal responsibility to provide the supervision of the
contractors by the Army officers, who report up the chain of command."
Quimby also reported at the time the Taguba report was illegally leaked to the press that he had inquired of the Army if it was satisfied with CACI's work and the response he received was "yes."
|Error||CACI's contract was a "cost-plus" contract that provided commissions (fees) to the company for add-on service and cost overruns. FALSE|
|Truth||CACI's contract was not a cost-plus contract. The U.S. government does not engage in cost-plus "percentage (of cost)
fee" contracts, only in reimbursable fixed fee, or incentive, or award fee contracts. Contractor fees, based on a percentage of
cost, on "cost plus" contracts have not been utilized by the government since at least the 1950s (if ever).
CACI's IT blanket purchase agreement with the Department of the Interior was what is commonly known as time and material (T&M) contract, where a fixed number of hours are worked per week per employee and so charged on an hourly rate basis. Material costs, if any, or other approved and necessary costs associated with the work, are charged at cost as approved by the government customer.
|Error||CACI violated federal regulations by allowing its civilian project manager to assist in the contract process by helping to draft initial statement of work language. FALSE|
|Truth||Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) bars contractor involvement in drafting a statement of work
only if it
provides the contractor a competitive advantage. But the CACI interrogator contract was initiated as a sole source award issued under
urgent wartime conditions, and the FAR at section 9.505-2(b) allows for a contractor to assist in preparing the statement of work when
it is a sole source award. The government always makes all its final contract decisions.
Federal contracting rules, which were changed in the 1990's government acquisition reform, explicitly recognize that contractor assistance is allowed for these types of contract actions, as in CACI's contracting case. In the context of this contracting situation, the assistance was agreed and accepted by the U.S. government during urgent wartime conditions in order to quickly meet the needs of the U.S. military. This process was also subject to review and approval by the government at every step, and the contract transaction passed legal review by the Army's Judge Advocate General Corps before it was awarded to CACI.
|Error||CACI relied on interrogation work for revenue growth. CACI engaged in illegal acts in its interrogation practices to increase its profits. FALSE|
|Truth||CACI did not seek interrogation work but responded to a need for such services by the U.S. Army for this work. CACI's interrogation work was nominal, representing less than 1% of the company's total business. Nor was there ever any condition set to increase quotas, and none of the official and publicly disclosed investigations have produced any evidence of this. In fact, because of CACI's rigorous scrutiny in its hiring process, some authorized interrogation positions were left unfilled.|
|Error||The GSA investigation and correspondence regarding CACI meant the contractor was barred from federal contracts. FALSE|
|Truth||GSA's initial letter requested a response from CACI on several contract issues and a final letter said GSA saw no reason to suspend/debar CACI. The company was neither barred nor suspended from government contracts.|
|Error||CACI's debt rating was downgraded. FALSE|
|Truth||Standard & Poor's briefly placed CACI on "watch status" during the initial Iraq crisis, but the company's debt ratings were never downgraded.|
|Error||CACI's interrogation business put shareholder investments at risk. FALSE|
|Truth||CACI's interrogation work in Iraq never placed investments in the company at risk. The company's work in Iraq, though quite important to CACI and the U.S. Army, was a small part of CACI's overall portfolio of contracts (less then 1%) and was not pursued as a major line of business. GSA's review of CACI's BPA contract with the DOI at Ft. Huachuca was promptly completed without business interruption.|
|Error||The Calvert Group of mutual funds concluded that CACI violated human rights and was a weapons-maker. FALSE|
|Truth||CACI is a recognized industry leader in corporate ethics and has never committed or been a party to any human rights abuses. CACI does not condone such behavior. Such charges have no basis in fact and are totally without merit. CACI has never been a weapons maker or weapons merchant. The Calvert Group determined to divest itself of stock in CACI because of the allegations in the Taguba Report. To CACI's knowledge, the Calvert Group made no evidence-based determination itself regarding CACI's conduct in Iraq.|
|Error||CACI has no corporate policy on ethics and human rights. FALSE|
|Truth||For several decades, CACI has had established policies on ethics and corporate values. CACI provides, as a standard part of its business practice, several documents that are published by the company on ethics, the rights of others, and the process for reporting wrongdoing by employees. All CACI employees execute and annually recertify their understanding of, and commitment to, abide by CACI's Code of Ethics and Business Conduct Standards. In addition, every CACI employee deployed to work in Iraq also executes an additional document, the CACI Code of Conduct in Iraq.|
|Error||CACI did a poor job of due diligence when acquiring PTG. FALSE|
|Truth||A thorough due diligence was performed when CACI bought out PTG. This was a regular and routine part of the CACI mergers and acquisition program. There were no significant defects discovered at the time of the transaction (which closed in May of 2003).|
|Error||California State Treasurer Phil Angelides, along with the California funds CalPERS and CalSTRS, contacted CACI to answer questions about the company's work at Abu Ghraib without success before notifying The Washington Post that they wanted to talk to CACI. FALSE|
|Truth||CACI participated in several investor conferences, on May 20th, June 2nd and June 8th, to provide the investor community with the verified facts and information that the company had on the Abu Ghraib situation and to answer question. However, the company found no record of anyone from the California funds participating on the calls or the webcast of those calls. No one from the California funds contacted CACI seeking information about its Iraq business or to ask questions prior to notifying the Post. CACI subsequently found no issues raised by the California State Treasurer's Office that the company had not already addressed fully in its public information releases.|
|Error||CACI was in "denial" about its Abu Ghraib work. FALSE|
|Truth||CACI frequently distributed information to the public about issues regarding its work at Abu Ghraib through several channels, including numerous press releases. CACI also posted information on an Iraq section of its website as it became known. At the same time, CACI followed the rule of law, especially the principle that an individual is innocent until proven guilty. There were no CACI "denials" about any facts or truths about the company's interrogator work at Abu Ghraib prison. CACI did not and will not come to judgment unless and until all the relevant facts are set forth.|
|Error||CACI was not forthcoming in telling the public what it knew about Abu Ghraib at the time the scandal broke. CACI was not forthcoming with information on the crisis as it unfolded. FALSE|
|Truth||CACI became aware of the Abu Ghraib abuses at the same time as the public. CACI was forthcoming with all
constituencies regarding CACI's business in Iraq and disseminated information that the company became aware of through official
investigations that were being conducted at the time. CACI practiced open and honest communications in every aspect of the Iraq Abu
Ghraib case, as demonstrated by its numerous press releases, extensive investor and employee outreach activities, and cooperation with
all U.S. government investigations.
CACI also launched its own internal investigation and announced its preliminary findings to the public, even before other investigations were concluded. CACI was diligent in correcting erroneous media reports as soon as possible both directly to the source and in its posting of 42 frequently asked questions (FAQs) about CACI in Iraq on the company's website beginning on May 20, 2004. CACI has continued to update the site and to respond to erroneous information as needed.
|Error||CACI's Army client was unsatisfied with the interrogation services being performed. FALSE|
|Truth||Client correspondence to CACI expressed a high level of satisfaction and gratitude; CACI's initial interrogation
contract was replaced by a new contract in August of 2004.
CACI did have some challenges in meeting staffing levels for Iraq in the fall of 2004 due to the intensity of the dangers at the time, but there were never any significant problems with CACI's work expressed by the Army in Iraq. Frank Quimby, spokesman for DOI, reported at the time the Taguba report was illegally leaked that he had inquired of the Army if it was satisfied with CACI's work and the response he received was "yes."
|Error||CACI used large sums of money from political donations and its political action committees (PACs) to lobby Congress and influence legislation, including the defeat of a bill sponsored by Sen. Chris Dodd barring civilian contractors from certain kinds of military work. FALSE|
|Truth||CACI has no PAC, which contributes to political campaigns, CACI has never been involved with a PAC, never lobbied Congress about legislation, and had no role whatsoever regarding the Dodd bill. Any political contributions coming from CACI employees are made on a private individual basis at the employee's choice, as far as the company is aware, and have represented contributions to both Democratic and Republican members and parties.|
|Error||Members of CACI's Board of Directors are selected for the purpose of exerting influence to gain favor for CACI business and contract awards. Current and past CACI board members had roles/influence in CACI's Abu Ghraib work/contract "cover up." FALSE|
|Truth||CACI has a strict conflict of interest policy for members of its Board of Directors, which operates as an independent body consistent with the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and New York Stock Exchange rules. Since CACI is a public company, CACI board members are all publicly elected by the shareholders every year. CACI's board represents leaders in the industry because they have the expertise to provide industry advice and direction. There has never been any CACI "cover up." No current or former CACI board member has ever used any influence or engaged in inappropriate activities whatsoever with regard to the Iraq crisis or any other matter at any time.|
|Error||CACI and its CEO, in particular, made excessive profits from the company's work in Iraq. FALSE|
|Truth||The profit margins of government services contractors have historically been lower than commercial business, so much
so that Wall Street analysts and investors have often ignored these companies in the past. With the decline of the "dot com" industry in
early 2001, however, government contracting stock values began to rise as they became more attractive to investors who saw the solid
business opportunity and history of service they represented. Following the 9/11 terrorist attacks, some government contractors, like
CACI, that provided high tech defense and security related services, particularly in homeland security and intelligence, saw their stock
As demand for services increased, revenue and profits also increased. CACI implemented a stock split in December 2001, some 18 months prior to the Iraq War. Moreover, CACI's work in Iraq represented less than 1% of the company's overall business. In addition, CACI's acquisition program added increased revenue and profit to the company, particularly with the AMS acquisition in May 2004.
Further, CACI's CEO has accumulated stock for nearly 35 years, the value of which has increased over the duration. Approaching the age of 70, he began several years ago to sell his stock for retirement. Some have confused (perhaps intentionally) his stock sales as salary or "profit," which is not true. The yearly salary of CACI's CEO is below other industry leaders and the stock he has sold represents the result of a lifetime of work – not profit or pay made during the Iraq War. Moreover, during this period thousands of American investors, pensioners, and working people have seen their investment in CACI appreciate as well.
|Error||CACI has leveraged business with the government through its connections with members of Congress and people of influence. FALSE|
|Truth||CACI does not have a history of close relationships or connections with members of Congress or people connected to those in Congress, nor has the company traditionally used the service of lobbyists. When CACI found itself under attack in the media after the Abu Ghraib events became public, the company had to familiarize itself to those on Capital Hill, and this was done primarily through staffers rather than getting direct meetings with members of Congress. Publicly televised Congressional hearings on May 7, 2004 showed that Congressional leaders were not familiar with CACI.|
|Error||CACI has used the services of lobbyists like the Livingston Group to gain influence on Capital Hill. FALSE|
|Truth||CACI does not have a history of lobbying. The Livingston Group was used in the Louisiana region for marketing support and business development assistance from 1999-2001. The firm of Clark and Weinstock was engaged by CACI in the summer of 2004 during the company's Abu Ghraib ordeal to assist in its government relations efforts to familiarize those on Capitol Hill with the company.|
|Error||The Center for Constitutional Rights (CCR) successfully pressured CACI into dropping its interrogation contract in Iraq. FALSE|
|Truth||CCR has had no bearing at any time on CACI contract work or any other business issue for that matter. CACI was not successful in its re-bid for the Iraq interrogator contract, which was awarded to L-3 Corp. at the Army's choosing in 2005. A significant number of CACI's interrogators took employment with the new company and remained in Iraq to support the U.S. Army. This is further evidence that CACI interrogators met the experience and professional qualifications required by the Army contract.|
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